Introduction
For the first time, I knew who I was.
For the first time, I felt as if I had been simultaneously exploded in the gaze, in the violent gaze of the other, and at the same time, recomposed as another (Fanon 1967: 118) Diaspora and identity studies continue to occupy a central role in social science and cultural studies discussions around increasingly politicised issues, such as nation, immigration and immigrants, migration, asylum, borders and exile. While current studies have extensively explored diaspora's nostalgia for the homeland and relationship with the host society (Safran 1991; Clifford 1994; Cohen 2001; Tsagarousianou 2004) , literature exploring how the homeland constructs the diaspora is still lacking.
'Diaspora' is a contested and unstable term. As Braziel and Mannur (2003) note, its etymological origins are in the Greek term diasperien, from dia, 'across', and sperien, 'to sow or scatter seeds'. However, although this meaning is fairly mainstream in the contemporary context, its use is also problematicsuggesting clearly demarcated geographic territories, national identity, and belonging and dislocation from fixed nation-states, territories, or countries. Such definitions may not allow for diaspora as a self-ascription or a state of consciousness and/or social form (Sökefeld 2006; Vertovec 1997) , and risk falling within the same outdated paradigms that referred to 'race' and ethnicity (Sökefeld 2006; Anthias 1998; . As such, experiences of the diaspora/ric, outside a territoriality of some kind, and, moreover, the relationships that homelands have with their diaspora have largely been ignored.
Kosovo and the Balkans drew much attention during the 1990s predominantly due to the nature of the conflict and the ethnic cleansing that ensued. Studies of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, especially in the UK, have steadily emerged since the 1990s, but the number remains low and limited, mainly focusing on Kosovo Albanians as immigrants or 'new migrants' (Vathi 2013) . Some important work has emerged, which explores Kosovo Albanian identity and integration (Kostovicova and Prestreshi 2003; Vathi 2013) . However diaspora research, especially that originating from Kosovo, predominantly focuses on policy, remittances, homeland development and brain drain projects (FID 2009; USAID 2010; UNDP 2012; Xharra and Waehlisch 2012; KAS 2013) . As Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) state:
Our analytical lens must necessarily broaden and deepen because migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields, encompassing those who move and those who stay behind. (1003) This article shifts the focus to examine the cultural relations of Kosovan Albanian diaspora, and the meaning of diaspora for those who remain in the homeland as well as migrants themselves. By analysing the use of the subverted German word 'Schatzi' by homeland Kosovo Albanians to construct and constitute the Kosovo Diaspora, I explore how diaspora discourse is shaped -not only by relationships between the individual or community in the host country, but also through homeland discourses about diaspora.
Methodology
This article presents findings from analysis of thirteen semi-structured indepth interviews with Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. The interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Kosovo between September and October 2012 and via Skype between January and July 2013. Out of the thirteen interviews conducted, nine were with members of civil society -mainly those working in NGOs, media and philanthropic organisations. Two interviews were conducted with Ministry of Diaspora officials, one with a government minister, and one with the leader of an opposition party.
By using a critical discourse analytical approach (CDA) to analyse my empirical data (Wodak 1997) , my aim is not to search out what people 'truly' mean or feel, but rather, from a social constructivist perspective, to investigate how certain positions and ideas about Kosovan diasporic identity are constructed as 'truth' within the texts under analysis, and to what effect they may operate as discourse. (Fairclough 1995; Coupland et al. 1999; Jørgensen and Phillips 2009; Wodak et al. 2009 ). The approach assumes that there is a material and productive dimension to discourse, which constitutes identities and social groups Wodak et al. 2009 ), and enables the creation of knowledge in society (Weedon 1987) . CDA is 'critical' in the sense that it aims to reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world, including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power (Jørgensen and Phillips 2009). In my analysis, therefore, I highlight the rhetorical and discursive strategies used to construct and reconstruct the diaspora Kosovo Albanians as 'other' in relation to time and place of migration, highlighting that diaspora identity construction is not only about looking back to the homeland, but also about the gaze of the homeland towards the diaspora.
I conducted my interviews in relatively relaxed and flexible environments, which enabled me to deal with unanticipated turns in the conversation and provided the opportunity for feedback and clarification of ambiguous points. I also chose to employ in-depth semistructured interviews because I wanted to collect data from individuals involved in civil society with significant social capital, and who are likely to have influence in shaping discourses about diaspora. The approach also enabled me to explore how the meaning of Kosovan Albanian diasporic identity is constructed, both through relating personal experience and other kinds of story about the diaspora. As Seidman (2006) puts it:
Stories are a way of knowing. In order to give the details of their experience a beginning, middle, and end, people must reflect on their experience. It is this process of selecting constitutive details of experience, reflecting on them, giving them order, and thereby making sense of them that makes telling stories a meaning-making experience. (7) The analysis is divided into three sections. The first section, entitled 'The Urban and Rural Divide', explores the discursive construction of the 'gastarbeiters' -guest workers -and political exiles. This is followed by analysis of the discursive construction and representation of the Kosovo Albanians from Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Nordic countries as 'Schatzi'. This word stems from a subversion of the German word Schatz, which literally translates into English as 'treasure'. The word is used in German slang as the equivalent of the English words sweetheart or darling. However, in Kosovo 'Schatzi' carries a very specific connotation, around which a stereotypical discourse is articulated about the Kosovo Diaspora as a particular social, cultural and economic group. In the final section, a range of issues and perceptions about diaspora returning to Kosovo is explored, especially with respect to how they are strongly associated with financial investments and remittances to Kosovo.
Urban and Rural Divide
It is widely estimated that between onein-three and one-in-four Kosovo Albanians lives outside Kosovo in what the Kosovo Albanians refer to as the 'diaspora' (Forum 2015 (Forum 2007 FID 2009; UNDP 2010; World Bank 2011; European Commission 2012) . In the Albanian language the word 'diaspora' is synonymous with what in English would be translated as 'outside' or 'abroad'. However, if approximately one-in-three Kosovo Albanians live in the diaspora -'outside' or 'abroad' -it is very likely that every family in Kosovo has someone living in diaspora. As Avtar Brah notes, diaspora is 'inhabited' 'not only by those who have migrated and their descendants but equally by those who are constructed and represented as indigenous' (Brah 1996: 181) . Therefore, it is important to engage those who have not migrated -the indigenous -in order to explore how they imagine, perceive and construct those who did.
The periods of migration from Kosovo can be historically traced and divided into four distinct phases: those who migrated from the 1940s to the 1960s due to the brutal Aleksandar Ranković security policy (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003; Blumi 2003) , those who migrated from 1963 to the end of the 1970s (Bernhard 2012), and those who started to migrate from the 1980s to the early 1990s -before visas were introduced by western countries for Yugoslav nationals (although illegal migration continued), and finally between 1998 and 1999 during the Kosovo War (Kostovicova and Prestreshi 2003) .
Historically, Kosovo has had a very distinct urban/rural divide (Blumi 2002; UNDP 2004) . Throughout Yugoslavia, those who were well-educated and residing in the cities looked down on the agricultural and uneducated rural population, and Kosovo is no exception (Allcock 2002) . It has been common to hear references to those from the city as 'Qytetar', implying that they were an elite class, and to the 'Katundar' or 'Katunart', meaning those from the villages, implying a backward, rough and uneducated person (or simply the equivalent of a 'hick'). This discriminatory discourse has existed despite considerable mixing of individuals and families, particularly amongst those settling in the capital, Prishtina. It is important to draw attention to these stereotypes because the diaspora of Kosovo is composed of populations from a mixture of both urban and rural areas, cities and villages.
From the interview data, it is evident that destination matters in how these stereotypes play out in the homeland discourse surrounding Kosovan Albanian diaspora. Respondents clearly imagine those who migrated to Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Nordic countries as predominantly rural, unskilled workers, whereas in contrast, those who migrated to the UK are thought of as urban city dwellers, who were already welleducated before they migrated and who migrated due to political persecution, rather than for economic reasons. Moreover, in comparison to those 'thinking', 'intellectual' elites who were persecuted by the system and regime and had no choice but to leave, there is a suggestion that migrating for economic reasons is negative and a personal individual choice.
It is well documented that migration from the areas of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to Western Europe increased during the 1990s as each one of the six republics and then the autonomous province of Kosovo resisted the Milosevic regime, which led to apartheid, ethnic cleansing and genocide (Sofos 1996; Malcolm 1998; HRW 2001; Tatum 2010; Booth 2012) . However, migration from Kosovo to Western Europe started before the 1990s. In 1963 Yugoslavia legalised the emigration of its unemployed nationals and they were free to leave the country and find work as 'gastartbeiters' -guest workers -in Western Europe, predominantly in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and France (Bernard 2012) . The total number of those who emigrated from the former Yugoslavia as guest workers during the 1960s and 1970s is deemed to have been around 1.3 million, with the participation of Kosovo estimated to be quite small (Bernhard 2012). The extent to which 'gastarbeiters' are distinguished from asylum-seeking Kosovo Albanians in the construction of the 'schatzi' discourse is one question that this article will address.
During the interviews I asked the interviewees what they thought about the Kosovo Albanian diaspora. The answers were complex, usually beginning with a narrative that involved stance-taking, and the use of rhetorical and other discursive devices to position the diaspora in relation to the homeland, and into specific times and historical periods of migration. The interviewees also provided specific reasons they believed caused these migrations (either economic, political or a mixture of both) and identified specific places they assumed that certain socio-economic groups migrated to. The first group of migrants forming this imagined diaspora were constructed as economic migrants who emigrated to find employment in the West as guest workers or 'gastarbeiters'; the second, those who were fleeing political persecution during the late 1980s and 1990s; the third, the refugees who left during the NATO intervention in the 1999 war.
The interviewees began describing the diaspora by providing historical narratives of migration, which in most cases began with explaining the migration of guest workers, or more generally talking about economic migrants from the 1960s. Indeed, there was a disproportionate level of emphasis on describing the diaspora who migrated to Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Nordic countries as 'gastarbeiters'. Other periods of migration, for example, to places such as Turkey during the Rankovic years, 1946-1966, were largely ignored. Distinct periods of migration linked with common destinations were referred to with apparent ease, suggesting that this knowledge is drawn from a common national historical narrative, or a 'regime of truth' in the Foucauldian sense. This was generally followed by differentiation and classification of those time and destination specific migrant groups, with examples of perceived reasons and routes of migration. For example, in response to my question 'how do you think that the diaspora is viewed by Kosovar society', the interviewee KG begins by recalling this narrative of diaspora KG: So as you know our Diaspora, we have the first wave of migrants from Kosovo were in the mid sixties, with the German immigration program gastarbeiters and basically this is the level of society that was unemployed during communism which was something very very uncommon to be unemployed during communism that managed to get these jobs and establish the first communities of Kosovo Albanians in in Germany and so on […].
By beginning with 'as you know', KG suggests that this is a well-known phenomenon, the understanding of which is socially shared (although, in the case of KG's statement, it could also imply that this is knowledge shared amongst those who are involved in study or work on the diaspora). As Homi Bhabha (1983) states in relation to colonial discourse, it could be argued that the classification of the diaspora into three distinct migrant groups relies on the concept of 'fixity', since a discursive construction reliant on difference as well as rigidity is present in the language and narrative of homeland Kosovo Albanians. This includes the use of stereotypes to indicate taken-forgranted meaning that cannot be proved, but which is presented as 'in place' and 'already known'. How this stereotype operates can be found both in subtle linguistic features of KG's statement, and also in more explicit presuppositions. For example, KG uses the term 'our diaspora', which functions to position the diaspora in relation to Kosovo, constructing it both as a possession belonging to Kosovans, and -with an implied power relation, favouring homeland Kosovo -an entity that is separate from Kosovo. KG also suggests that those who left to work as guest workers were somehow incapable of getting jobs in what he represented as a good economic climate in communist Yugoslavia where almost everyone was employed. In fact, at the time of the legalisation of migration to Western Europe, Yugoslavia was going through a recession; there was high unemployment and a hard currency crisis (Batović 2009; Bernhard 2012). By the end of the 1970s Yugoslavia was attempting to bring back those migrants and developed policies of return. However, due to the constant persecution of Kosovo Albanians during this period, and the common persecution of those who returned from the West in former Yugoslavia (returning migrants suspected by the security services for holding democratic ideas not in tune with the communist ideology of the time could be punished with imprisonment), it is possible that some did not return and instead became political asylum seekers -a possibility ignored by KG.
KG:
The second generation is the one of migrants during the nineties basically between nineteen-ninety and nineteen-ninety-five and then the third generation is the one of the war refugees of nineteenninety-nine […] Although KG in his account provides a very clear description as he attempts to define the diaspora, he subsequently states that this is difficult because it is now a mixture of many groups:
KG: So it's very difficult to define Kosova diaspora right now, even if we focus on one particular country or one particular region because it its consisted of three different generations of migrants who now have a hybrid community established and it's really difficult to draw any kind of general conclusions.
However, this complexity, according to him, is due to 'three different generations of migrants', rather than, for example, being a result of their complex diversity in terms of age, gender, geographic and socio-economic background within Kosovo and many varied places of destination as migrants. By structuring his account of the diaspora around the idea of 'three different generations', it is privileged, legitimised and further 'fixed'. As such, any pre-existing hybridity of the diasporic group is obfuscated, hybridity instead being apparently born out of subsequent developments of the diaspora in host societies 'who now have a hybrid community established'.
The idea that KG's response taps into an already fixed stereotypical, ideological and historical framework through which the diaspora are seen is further supported by the account of another interviewee, HA. Opening with the statement that there are 'phases of when the diaspora is made', his narrative also reifies the temporal, or generational grouping of migrants. The two main motivations for migration he suggests, economic and political, are later amalgamated due to the Milosevic regime:
HA: […] the key is to I think, uh, look at the different phases when diaspora is made. So I think up to 1989 it was purely [telephone interruption] So I think it was purely two types of diaspora people, one which was basically an economic, ah, or incentives for becoming diaspora were economic […] or the one would be the political asylum seekers, or people who left the what was Yugoslavia at that time because they were seen as a threat or were threatened by the regime. These two groups were the majority of the diaspora for Kosovo, and then in 1989 it became a mixture of both political and economic because of the measures that were taken in expelling people from jobs and schools that was done by the Milosevic regime. So that basically these two clear divisions became unified in a way with the new diaspora, which I think it also, because of the assumption of the young population could potentially became part of the military and military forces that could fight the regime at that time, it was a lot more easier for young people to get out get a passport and get out in Europe but not only.
This historical narrative not only constructs binaries between those who left for economic reasons and those who left as political asylum seekers, but also conforms to a linear narrative structure implying a continuous process with a specific beginning, middle and end.
HA also differentiates the diaspora by country of destination, stating that the urban educated migrated to the UK, whereas the rural uneducated migrated to other parts of Europe:
HA: Also what is, I think characteristic for UK diaspora is that a lot of urban population moved to UK. Which was not the case in other parts of Europe, which mostly was a rural diaspora, people that moved from rural areas […] .
Despite a lack of clear official data about those who migrated to the UK, the assumption that most were educated and urban might be explained by the absence of guest worker agreements between the UK and Yugoslavia (since the guest workers or 'gastarbeiters' were the ones who were rural and uneducated). However, as the following extract from HA's interview shows, the distinction 'urban (educated)'-'rural (uneducated)' is also important in terms of the value judgments attached to the diaspora, especially in terms of their perceived contributions to the homeland:
HA: […] you can see the influence of the urban diaspora on the cultural social life in Kosova when they either back for a longer period or for a temporary kind of interim period of their stay in Kosovo. That influence is easily seen in music for example, that has emerged in during the transition in Kosovo, and the designs and architecture, that a lot of educated UK diaspora tried to support development and I think you can also see a lot of very unique very expert or what do you call the, uhm, deficit in terms of the human capital that Kosovo had. In terms of planning and management, which still I guess because of other complexities of development in Kosovo not necessarily has become a mainstream but you see successful individuals, which come back and also connect to Kosovo from UK diaspora.
This type of classification of the diaspora reveals the perceived social layers through which these distinctions are embedded and linked to host-country place of residence. Specifically, those who are from the UK are constructed as urban-educated by nearly all the interviewees, as another, XHR, states in his reflection on Kosovan diaspora integration:
XHR: I mean that as far as it concerns my perception, in UK in London especially, uh, emigrated most people from Prishtina mostly. While people, uh, people from surroundings from villages emigrated to Switzerland and Germany where they already had a cousin, or father or somebody older living. But a part of that, I do have a feeling that British society and policies are more inclusive to newcomers. They gave more opportunities for the diaspora to get included to their life. I don't know schools, work whatever, sort of they do not feel neglected or like Third World, as they do in Germany and Switzerland. DP: OK, so you think there is more discrimination in Germany and Switzerland perhaps?
XHR: Exactly
The extract suggests that the UK is responsible for producing a more educated diaspora with the 'opportunities' and 'inclusion' that are supposed to exist in the UK, as opposed to in Germany and Switzerland. While emphasising the notion that the UK diaspora is more educated and likely to become more so, the perception that those in Germany and Switzerland must be less educated and necessarily less integrated in their host societies is revealed.
Similarly, another interviewee, VC, suggests that the UK Kosovo Albanian Diaspora has integrated well in the UK because it is well-educated and urban:
VC: […] Of course in UK it's more specific because of the quality of migration there. Predominantly people who left for UK were from the cities, from Prishtina or from the big cities, and this has had an impact on their interaction to Kosovo and with our national cause so to say. So it is a more specific Diaspora, it cannot be compared with the one in Germany, where we've had bigger waves of migration that have started from seventies, sixties and then seventies and eighties. The same goes for Switzerland, whereas in in UK it's a more recent Diaspora and it's a Diaspora that predominantly comes from the cities and from Prishtina. So that makes the relationship more specific. They are most of them are integrated in the societies they live in, you don't see an Albanian street in London the way you have a Pakistani or a, I dunno, a Chinese or, uh ah, you don't have an Albanian quarter in UK, or whereas in Germany you, although you don't have a quarter, you have a neighbourhoods where the entire street is populated by Kosovar Albanians.
In these responses, a historic narrative of migration provides the structure through which the complexity and diversity of the Kosovan Albanian Diaspora is reduced and simplified into familiar binary categories of urban v rural, educated vuneducated, gastarbeiter v political exiles and integrated and un-integrated. The following section demonstrates how this framework of understanding diaspora from the homeland provides the conditions of possibility for the construction of the stereotype 'schatzi'.
The Schatzi
The use of the word 'schatzi' in Kosovo originates from a subversion of the German word Schatz, which is literally translated into English as treasure. The word is used in slang German as the equivalent of the English words sweetheart or darling. As such, in Kosovo 'schatzi' is subverted and used as a familiar trope, a rhetorical device, which generates meaning in a new subverted context. The word 'schatzi' relates a very specific meaning, intended to signify a particular social and economic group in the Kosova Diaspora and their relationship to homeland. 'Schatzi' is used alongside the English words of endearment, 'honeys' and 'darlings', as a similar trope, having entered the Albanian language to describe diaspora stereotypically. Following the example of 'schatzi', the terms of endearment 'honey' and 'darling' are also subverted in their meaning when used by homeland Kosovo Albanians to construct and 'other' the diaspora, especially those who reside in the UK and US.
As the extracts from the interviews show, 'schatzi' is a well-established stereotype used in the language of Kosovo Albanians as a discursive and rhetorical device to generate meaning when referring to diaspora from continental Europe, but more specifically from Germany and Switzerland. For example, a certain social hierarchy is signified as one respondent describes the difference in 'fashion styles' between what she perceives as the 'diaspora in England' and the 'diaspora in Germany and Switzerland': XHR: I might touch upon one of my professions, like design, diaspora in England is very well, uh how to say, uh, has fit very well in the English England's fashion styles, while for example diaspora in Germany and Switzerland, whenever you see them in Prishtina or other cities of Kosova you immediately know that they are schatzis, we call them schatzis from Germany and Switzerland because they mostly wear white things. They can be linen shirts or trousers, they are white, from their socks and shoes are white. So whenever our, uh ah uh… our Plaza becomes white, we know that it is because of diaspora from Germany and Switzerland. Although when we talk about diaspora in England they have much better cultivated taste when it comes to dresses, they are influenced by best fashion designers, they care about their quality of life, they enjoy beautiful dresses and they care about it. They are influenced very much by new fashion trends. Which we cannot say, at least I cannot say about people who live in Germany, Switzerland or other European countries.
The binary differences between those who are diaspora in 'England' and diaspora in 'Germany' here are represented as very evident, discursively fixed through an appeal to transparency ('you immediately know that they are schatzis…') and to the legitimising force of collective cultural practice ('…we call them schatzis from Germany and Switzerland…'). As van Dijk notes, such expressions of group discourse 'expresses not only individual opinions, but rather socially shared representations ' (1992: 115) . Yet there was also a reflexive awareness amongst respondents about the role of 'schatzi' discourse in stereotyping sections of the diaspora differently:
BL: […] but then you know people here have stereotypes about the diaspora depending on like where they're coming from, you know, so like you have the Schatzis from Germany, you have you know, so it really depends where you're coming from you know, in terms of like what, what kind of stereotype in Kosovo you are gonna fit as. DP: Do they have one for the ones that come from the UK? BL: Definitely, the like the diaspora from the UK is considered more like a bit more stu-snobby, stuck up, you know, but a bit more creative, intellectual you know […] that's the stereotype about the diaspora from the UK. And that's like referring to the generation that left during the 90's […] but more like the early 90's. Whereas like the diaspora from Germany, you know, they you they, oh they are just like, quote 'katunar' you know, like 'Schatzis' and what not, it really depends on what country they are coming from, and you know, the diaspora from the US, it's like different … kind of like stereotype you know so, I think I think that's actually very interesting because the people like have mostly families… the UK you had, you had more like individuals kind of like leaving Kosovo, like on an individual like basis you know and going to the UK, whereas in like Germany, you have like huge like families like all together, and emigrating to like Germany or Switzerland you know? (DP: hmm) and then in the in the US most of the like the moving to the US haphappened like during 1999, […] also then, that is a different generation, because they did experience the 90s you know, so it's very interesting to look at what point and how these people left Kosovo and I think that that is a determining like a stereotype for those people when they come back to Kosovo as well.
BL
acknowledges that diaspora stereotypes are differentiated by the migrant's country of destination, stating that the UK diaspora are considered 'snobbish' and 'stuck up', as well as 'creative' and 'intellectual'. A contrast is drawn between the large family groups stereotypically associated with migration to Germany and Switzerland (corresponding with perceptions about rural populations in Kosovo, where larger families are assumed to correlate with a lack of education), and migration to the UK as a more individual venture. Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that an image of diaspora more in keeping with neoliberal norms for global mobility (individualised, educated and professionalised) might be expressed with more positive connotations. Throughout the interviews, issues of power and social inequality emerge, especially as strategies of positioning one's association with those diaspora who are more positively perceived become evident. For example, a respondent who works in civil society but also as a fashion designer suggests that she only has a clientele that is intellectual and UK-based rather than uneducated and Germany-based:
XHR: Lately we had those reunions […] it always depends you know what style designer has and with what sort of people one works. My clients are usually mostly intellectuals, and this is why I was working lately mostly with those coming for school reunions here in Kosova. And they usually needed improvements in dresses, which they already purchased in in London.
XHR clearly positions herself with the 'intellectual clientele', but she also suggests why the diaspora require her services. In stating that the UK diaspora come for school reunions, she again emphasises education as a distinguishing factor, in contrast to those who might, for example, need outfits for weddings, which are not constructed as intellectual events. For the latter, religious identity and practice is emphasised as a key characteristic:
DP: And what about those from other places like in Germany? XHR: Other places it is usually for marriages, because during summer in Kosova is marriage seasons, this season is changing a bit, it is influenced by Ramadan, (DP: OK) Ramadan this year starts I don't know whether beginning of July, and that's why there are not too many weddings, they do still exist, and that had an impact because no one here organises weddings without the confirmation of their whole family including diaspora. So wedding dates are usually arranged by vacations or free days of those members of the family living in diaspora.
By noting that she does not quite know when Ramadan begins, XHR distances herself from the more religiously constructed diaspora from Germany. Although XHR relates her direct experience working with diaspora, she also draws on culturally-shared ideologies and a dominant hegemonic discourse which represents and reaffirms existing social power structures valuing professional, intellectual, individual practices over traditional, cultural, group activities such as weddings or religious periods and festivities (Van Dijk 1995).
The 'schatzi' stereotype appears in such accounts to be positioned in relation to more positive perception of the UK diaspora, further emphasising the negative connotations of diaspora in Germany and Switzerland. Asked specifically about the public image of seasonally returning Kosovo Albanians from the UK diaspora, XHR asserts: XHR: It is very personalised, I personally do have respect for those coming from the UK, because I have the feeling, because as I said it's not only for fashion, but they are influenced by culture and by daily life there. While diaspora in, let's say Germany or Switzerland, those are most distinguished ones, uh, have not changed much especially in their mentality. They earned money, they are richer much richer than they were but their quality of life has not changed. I sort of have feeling that they are not, they have not changed, their mentality is the same one, even worse their mentality is the same as ours was when they left.
The suggestion here that a certain entrenched, traditional 'mentality', impervious to cultural influences, functions to mark the distinction between rural 'schatzi' and others in essentialist terms. Whilst the UK diaspora's 'mentality' is open and amenable to influence 'by culture and by daily life', the German and Switzerland group remains pathologically entrenched in pre-migration modes of thought.
It is worth noting that the interviews involving officials from the Ministry of Diaspora denied the existence of the 'schatzi' stereotype. One junior official's approach was to subvert the 'schatzi' trope, arguing that since 'schatzi' in German means treasure, what people mean when they call someone a 'schatzi' is to express an appreciation of their value. Furthermore, a more senior official narrating his own migration to Switzerland during the 1980s noted how, despite having lived previously in a rural area of Kosovo, he was a political exile, returning to Kosovo after the war to work in the Kosovo government. Drawing upon personal experience to offer an oppositional narrative that clearly contradicts the 'schatzi' stereotype, represents an important strategy of resistance, but one which remains vulnerable to dismissal as an exception to the rule, and which does not subvert the structure of dominance so devaluing the identity of guest workers labelled as 'schatzi'.
Cash cows
Money is strongly associated with the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, and diaspora remittances continue to be a key resource (FID 2009; USAID 2010; UNDP 2012; Xharra and Waehlisch 2012; KAS 2013) . It is estimated that the diaspora infuses the Kosovan economy with somewhere around 500 million euro each year. This was a strong theme in the interview responses, and as one interviewee stated, 'Over and over again, they are seen as cash-cows':
HA: I think this connects with what I was just saying. I think that the fact that diaspora has been supporting mostly their families and making at one point even one third of the budget of Kosovo, in a way their identity became money, we identified them and we feel and lived with them through money the relationship of the money, and I think that there is a lot of humour that has come out of the idea or the anaanalysing the relationship between people from the diaspora and here. So schatzi in my sense, is that in a short way this explains 'we love your money but we don't like the way you behave in in the society'. Which means there is a huge gap between people who live in diaspora and people who live in here. There is a subconscious idea that everyone that receives the money in Kosovo knows that is wrong and that immediately translates into some kind of rejection of identifying them as schatzi that ultimately makes them lower in rank than people who actually receive their money. So it's a huge disparity of relationships that has been built individually and then as a collective versus Kosovars who live in here, so it's a very very complex I would say relationship that everyone tries to avoid the debate therefore you exclude them by identifying them with some with a term that literally puts them as less. I don't think it's a class issue, it's a more ident labelling them with something that makes them less equal with Kosovars, even though they are the source of funding and the money for families and society.
Another interviewee, SB, who was only seventeen when she came to the UK in 1990 as an au pair, elaborates the issue of sending money home from the position of the migrant, 'I was the only person from my family to leave Kosova and due to the Milosevic regime which dismissed all Albanians from state institutions, I was the only member of my family to have an income and support my parents and siblings back home'.
In fact, even the government is trying to obtain more money from the diaspora, by charging those coming from the diaspora with western number plates more money to enter Kosovo. Nonetheless, recently there has been opposition to the treatment of the diaspora by the government of Kosovo. The opposition party Self-Determination or Vetvendosja expressed concern about the application of additional border fines that were being enforced and charged to 'compatriots from Diaspora'. In a press release from May 2011, they criticised the government for 'looting' the Diaspora Kosovo Albanians:
After many letters and e-mails that we receive from compatriots in the Diaspora, VETËVENDOSJA! has made an analysis of the policy issues that impose charges on foreign-registered vehicles entering Kosovo. As a result, each migrant who comes to vacation in Kosovo, pays twice for vehicle insurance, once in the country of origin and the other for the duration of their stay in Kosovo. (My translation) Furthermore, according to Vetvendosja 'from the millions "looted" from our diaspora, only 10% is used 'for the payment of damages' that the diaspora supposedly cause to the roads in Kosovo when they come for holidays during the summer months. The rest goes through to other budgets that are divided by the government at their discretion'. However, it appears that as Kosovo attempts to establish itself as a new self-reliant state, this economic relationship with the diaspora is changing, as KG states:
KG: So now how do we as Kosovars feel about them, well I think that we are in the process of getting detached from our dependency of diaspora which was basically created during the nineties where many sort of households had remittances as their only income of survival. Now we are entering a different phase where basically it's, uh, it's more like things are getting things are changing […] .
However, a more complex discourse emerges when the issues of the returning diaspora is addressed. Because the UK diaspora is positioned as welleducated and intellectual, there seem to be two lines of thought. One suggests that the UK diaspora is so well integrated in the UK that they would not return, and the other, that if they were to return, some anticipate them making a positive contribution, whereas others suggest that they would take highly-paid jobs as 'internationals' because they possess British passports. Thus, as the two extracts below show, the anxieties surrounding the return of the 'schatzi' vary significantly between countries of destination:
DP: Do you think that sometimes there is potential to view the UK diaspora because of what you have said their trendiness with fashion, their intellectualism, their cultural, their high cultural tastes, do you think they are seen as a little bit of a threat, as opposed to what you've described as the 'Schatzis' in Germany? You know do they seem like competition? XHR: No not at all, firstly because there is a common feeling that they do not plan to come back, they do not have reasons to plan to come, they are living a nice unstressful, not unstressful but less stressful life than we are, so while we have a feeling like when we when we talk with and about diaspora in Germany in Switzerland the feeling like we are still dealing with katunars, that feeling does not exists about and with Albanians in England.
Perhaps the anxiety around the UK diaspora is lessened by a perception that those in the UK do not intend to move back to Kosovo, as VC states:
VC: So in UK it's more specific, what we have seen in UK is people who have gone there to live and not to live and come back. I mean this is, I believe, the biggest difference between the Diaspora in UK and Diaspora.
Nonetheless, when those UK diaspora do return, and perhaps due to the perception of the UK diaspora as 'welleducated' and 'cultured' there is an anxiety that they return to work for international missions which are highly paid, thus putting the locals at a disadvantage. As the following quote from VC shows: VC: They come for jobs, but they work here, most of them work here as British citizens, they work with international organisations OSCE, EULEX, before UNMIK. So most of them have come back as Brits, and they have the British passport, they keep the British citizenship, they get very good salaries. But not many have come back to work for local salaries and local institutions, there are of course very few exceptions, but this was not the predominant trend and, there is nothing wrong with it, absolutely not.
Conclusion
'Schatzi' is not just a word, but a linguistic trope, embedded discursively and ideologically in the homeland culture of Kosova. It functions as a stereotype to construct and 'other' the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, especially in Germany and Switzerland. In the language and descriptions of the 'schatzi', interviewees state that on the one hand, the 'schatzi' have worked hard in host countries and have earned good incomes and accumulated wealth that has played an important role in the form of remittances. However, on the other hand, this 'cash cow' element of the 'schatzi' discourse has not necessarily translated into positive social status for the diaspora. Whilst the UK-based diaspora are often attributed with a cultural sophistication and 'mentality' that is linked with a framework of understanding that accepts their integration overseas and role in the 'international' labour market when returning to Kosova, the 'schatzi' more generally are represented as lacking cultural advancement and social capital, failing to climb the social ladder in their western host countries.
Through analysis of interview data, I have argued that the meaning of diaspora is not merely dependent upon how a migrant community closely identifies with an imagined homeland. To understand diaspora's complexities also requires focus on the imagined diaspora and its relationship(s) with the imagined homeland/host-land. Stuart Hall (2007) , states that the dominant western discourses, which described and differentiated between Europe and others, used European cultural categories, languages and ideas to represent the 'other'. As my analyses demonstrate, these dominant 'othering' discourses are also present in the discourses of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo who represent, categorise and differentiate their diaspora. The inherent heterogeneity and hybridity of diaspora are not captured in 'schatzi' discourse, but instead, rather broad generalisations depending on factors such as time of migration, place of migration and emigration and socio-economic factors, are applied to classify and explain the differences internal to the 'schatzi' stereotype. Thus the diaspora is imagined and actively constructed as 'schatzi' in the Kosovan Albanian homeland, but not as a homogenous entity, or, necessarily, entirely consistently.
